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Arbitration Case Law Update 2016
Jill I. Gross1
July 15, 2016
This chapter2 identifies decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court and selected federal and high state courts in the past year
that interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).3 This
chapter also analyzes the impact some of these cases might have
on securities arbitration practice.
I.

SUPREME COURT

Since last year’s update,4 the Supreme Court decided one
case involving the FAA and granted petitions for a writ of
certiorari in four others: of those four, the Court immediately
vacated judgments in three of the cases and the parties settled the
fourth before the Court could rule. This section describes those
cases.

1

Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace University.
I am grateful for the able research assistance of Rana Marie Abihabib,
J.D. Pace Law School, May 2016, and Michael Liik, J.D. Candidate, Pace
Law School, May 2017.
3
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2014). Because disputes resolved through
securities arbitration necessarily “involve commerce” (FAA § 2), courts
apply the FAA to legal issues arising out of securities arbitrations. See
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
4
My arbitration law updates for the PLI Securities Arbitration Course
Book for the years 2011 to 2016 can be accessed at
http://ssrn.com/author=485809. The 2015 update is dated May 27, 2015,
so this year’s chapter covers almost fourtheen months of cases.
2

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2847858

Under the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption doctrine, the
FAA preempts any state law or rule that conflicts with the policies
and purposes underlying the FAA.5 Those policies and purposes
include the requirement that courts place arbitration contracts “on
equal footing with all other contracts.”6
As predicted in last year’s update, in DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia,7 the Supreme Court held once again that the FAA
preempted a state court’s interpretation of its own law – in this
case the California Court of Appeal. The California court had held
that a California choice of law clause in the parties’ service
contract (which contract the parties agreed was governed by the
FAA) prevailed over the federal law-based FAA preemption
doctrine.8
In DIRECTV, consumers filed a class action in state court
against the satellite television service provider alleging it charged
early termination fees in violation of various California statutes.9
The form contract governing the satellite service contained a pre5

See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012)
(holding that the FAA preempts West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
rule that voided as against public policy arbitration clauses in nursing
home contracts with respect to negligence claims); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (ruling that FAA preempts state law
unconscionability defense that declares class action waivers in consumer
arbitration agreements per se unconscionable as inconsistent with the
FAA).
6
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). The
doctrine stems from the “savings clause” contained within FAA §2,
which preserves defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements on
“grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
9 U.S.C. §2.
7
136 S.Ct. 463 (2015).
8
See Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 190 (2014), rev’d,
136 S.Ct. 463 (2015).
9
DIRECTV, 136 S.Ct. at 466.
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dispute arbitration agreement (PDAA), a class action waiver, and a
choice of law clause that provided:
The interpretation and enforcement of this
Agreement shall be governed by the rules and regulations
of the Federal Communications Commission, other
applicable federal laws, and the laws of the state and local
area where Service is provided to you. This Agreement is
subject to modification if required by such laws.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 9 [the arbitration
clause including class action waiver] shall be governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act.10
The class action waiver clause added: “If, however, the law of your
state would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration
procedures unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is
unenforceable.”11
Based on this sentence in the class action waiver clause,
defendant did not initially move to compel arbitration because the
governing law of California at the time—known as the Discover
Bank rule12—would have voided the PDAA as unconscionable due
to the class action waiver. However, after the Supreme Court held
in Concepcion that the FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank
rule, defendant moved to compel individual arbitration.13
The trial court denied the motion and the California Court
of Appeal affirmed. The Court of Appeal interpreted the class
DIRECTV, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d at 193 (quoting parties’ agreement).
Id.
12
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)
(classifying most class action waivers in consumer contracts as
unconscionable).
13
DIRECTV, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d at 193.
10
11
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action waiver provision and found that reigning California law
“would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration
procedures unenforceable.”14 As a result, the entire PDAA was not
enforceable, according to the precise language of the contract. The
court rejected defendant’s argument that Discover Bank was no
longer state law because it was preempted, and instead accepted
plaintiffs’ argument that it should interpret state law without
regard to FAA preemption.15
Because the California Court of Appeal’s decision
conflicted with a Ninth Circuit holding that the FAA preemption
doctrine supersedes the parties’ choice of law clause,16 DIRECTV
sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court (the California Supreme
Court had denied its request for review.)17 The Supreme Court
agreed to decide the question: “Whether the California Court of
Appeal erred by holding, in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit,
that a reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act requires the application of state law
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.”18
Acknowledging in its majority opinion that interpretation
of contracts is a matter of state law, the Supreme Court framed the
issue not as whether the state court’s interpretation was correct, but
whether it was consistent with the FAA.19 The Court reasoned that
the California Court of Appeal’s decision that “the law of your
state” included “invalid California law” (i.e., the Discover Bank

14

Id.
Id. at 194-97.
16
See Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013).
17
DIRECTV, 136 S.Ct. at 467.
18
Pet. for Writ of Cert., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 2014 WL 5359805,
*i (2014).
19
DIRECTV, 136 S.Ct. at 468.
15
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rule) was a decision unique to arbitration contracts.20 As a result,
the Court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s
interpretation of the parties’ choice of law clause did not place
arbitration contracts on equal footing with all other contracts and
was thus preempted by the FAA.21
This predictable outcome in DIRECTV follows from the
Court’s extremely broad application of the FAA preemption
doctrine in recent years. It also signals the Court’s continued
impatience with state courts that attempt to circumvent the FAA by
finding a state law basis to invalidate an arbitration agreement.22
After DIRECTV, the Supreme Court granted petitions for
writs of certiorari in four other arbitration-related cases. However,
again showing impatience for state courts that seemingly ignore
the FAA, in all four cases, the Court summarily vacated the
underlying judgments and remanded the cases back to the state

20

Id. at 469. The Court analyzed California law and concluded that a
California court would not interpret “law of your state” to include
invalidated law in any context other than arbitration. Id. at 469-71.
21
Id. at 471.
22
Id. at 468 (“The Federal Arbitration Act is a law of the United States,
and Concepcion is an authoritative interpretation of that Act.
Consequently the judges of every State must follow it.”); see also NitroLift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 501 (2012) (holding that
FAA preempts Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling and stating that, when
interpreting the FAA, “it is a matter of great importance, therefore, that
state supreme courts adhere to a correct interpretation of the legislation.
Here, the Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to do so”); Marmet Health
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (holding that FAA
preempts Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s ruling and stating
that “[w]hen this Court has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a
state court may not contradict or fail to implement the rule so
established”).
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court for “further consideration in light of [DIRECTV].”23 All four
cases arose from state high courts that declared a PDAA
unconscionable under state law. In Spencer, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia had found a PDAA in a construction
contract unconscionable despite the presence of a delegation clause
that purported to delegate questions of arbitrability to the
arbitrator.24 In the three related Hawaii cases, the Supreme Court
of Hawaii had declared the same PDAA in a “condominium
declaration” ambiguous with respect to the condominium owners’
intent to arbitrate, and unconscionable because of its limitations on
discovery and punitive damages, and its confidentiality clause.25
Presumably, with the remand, the Court was instructing these state
courts that they did not sufficiently consider the FAA preemption
doctrine in reaching their decisions.
Before DIRECTV, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a
case stemming from a federal Court of Appeal’s apparent refusal
to apply the FAA preemption doctrine, but the parties settled the

23

See Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v. Spencer, 136 S.Ct. 1157
(2016) (remanding to Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia); RitzCarlton Development Co. v. Narayan, 136 S.Ct. 800 (2016) (remanding
to Supreme Court of Hawaii); Ritz-Carlton Development Co. v. Narayan,
and Ritz-Carlton Development Co. v. Nath, 136 S.Ct. 799 (2016)
(remanding both cases to Supreme Court of Hawaii).
24
See Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v. Spencer, 774 S.E.2d 1
(W.Va. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1157 (2016). On remand, the West
Virginia high court concluded that defendant waived its right to challenge
the delegation clause, and thus referred the case to arbitration for an
arbitrability determination. Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v.
Spencer, __ S.E.2d __, 2016 WL 3475631 (W.Va. June 13, 2016).
25
See Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co., 350 P.3d 995 (Haw. 2015),
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016); Nath v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 356 P.3d
1043 (Haw. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016); Narayan v. Marriott
Intern., 350 P.3d 1043 (Haw. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016).
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case before the Court could rule.26 In Zaborowski, the Ninth
Circuit found a PDAA in an employment contract unconscionable
and, applying a California rule that allows courts not to sever
offending parts of a PDAA if it is “permeated” by
unconscionability,27 declared the arbitration agreement
unenforceable.28 Petitioners sought review on the ground that the
Ninth Circuit should have held the FAA preempted the
Armendariz rule because California applies a more lenient
severability doctrine to ordinary contracts as opposed to that
applied to arbitration contracts.29
II.

FEDERAL AND STATE COURT
DECISIONS

The remainder of this chapter summarizes decisions from
lower federal courts and state high courts applying the Supreme
Court’s FAA jurisprudence when ruling on challenges to the
arbitrability of a particular dispute and on motions to confirm or
vacate arbitration awards. Where applicable, the chapter will
discuss implications for FINRA arbitration.
A.

Who Decides Arbitrability?

It is well-settled that courts, not arbitrators, decide
challenges to the substantive arbitrability of a dispute “’unless the

26

MHN Government Services, Inc. v. Zaborowski, 136 S.Ct. 27 (2015),
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 1539 (2016).
27
See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services., Inc., 6 P.3d
669 (Cal. 2000).
28
See Zaborowski v. MHN Gov't Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461 (9th Cir.
2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015), and cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct.
1539 (2016).
29
Pet. for Writ of Cert., MHN Government Services, Inc. v. Zaborowski,
2015 WL 3637766 (U.S. June 10, 2015).
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parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’”30 The
majority of lower courts considering this question find that the
incorporation by reference of a forum’s rules that empower
arbitrators to decide substantive arbitrability constitutes such “clear
and unmistakable evidence.”31
However, this past year in the FINRA context, in Morgan
Stanley & Co., LLC v. Couch,32 one district court concluded that
“incorporation of the FINRA rules into the Arbitration Clause does
not provide clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties
intended to submit the issue of arbitrability to arbitration.”33 In
Couch, an industry employment dispute, the firm argued that the
financial advisor (FA) had waived his right to arbitrate, because he
first litigated his claims in court for more than one year. Before
deciding that the FA had indeed waived his right to arbitration, the
district court concluded that the issue was one for the court to
decide—not the arbitrator— because it could not locate a FINRA

30

Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S 79, 83 (2002).
E.g., Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2015)
(incorporation of AAA rules); Considine v. Brookdale Senior Living,
Inc., 124 F. Supp.3d 83, 91 (D. Conn. 2015) (incorporation of AAA
rules); Adtile Techs. Inc. v. Perion Network Ltd., __ F. Supp.3d __, No.
CV 15-1193-SLR, 2016 WL 3475335, at *6 (D. Del. June 24, 2016)
(incorporation of JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules). But see
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746 (3d
Cir. 2016) (incorporation of AAA rules is not “clear and unmistakable”
evidence parties intended to delegate issue of class arbitrability to
arbitrators); Global Client Solutions, LLC. v. Ossello, 367 P.3d 361
(Mont. 2016) (incorporation by reference of AAA rules is not “clear and
unmistakable” evidence that parties intended arbitrators to decide
arbitrability).
32
134 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that court would decide
whether employee waived his right to arbitrate).
33
Id. at 1226.
31
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arbitration rule comparable to the AAA rule that arbitrators have
the power to decide their own jurisdiction.34
In light of Couch, if firms want to delegate a substantive
arbitrability determination to FINRA arbitrators rather than courts,
they should include a more specific delegation clause rather than
rely on incorporating by reference FINRA arbitration rules.
B.

Defenses to Arbitrability

Once deciding questions of arbitrability, courts must apply
the Moses H. Cone presumption of arbitrability,35 but compel
arbitration of only those disputes that the parties contracted to
submit to arbitration. Thus, courts must construe the terms of the
parties’ arbitration agreement like any other contract to give effect
to the parties’ intent.36 This section turns to substantive
arbitrability determinations by courts in the past year.
1. Scope
Courts sometimes conclude that a particular dispute is not
encompassed within the scope of the parties’ arbitration
agreements. For example, in Lloyd v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
& Chase Investment Services Corp.,37 the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims fell outside the
scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement. In Lloyd, plaintiffs,
former employees of the affiliated defendants, brought a
34

Id.
See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (instructing courts to presume a dispute is arbitrable).
36
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682
(2010) (stating that “as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions
control”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
37
791 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2015).
35
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class/collective action in district court alleging violations of state
(class) and federal (collective) overtime laws. Defendants moved
to compel arbitration and argued that the arbitration agreements,
which plaintiffs had entered into via their employment agreements
and executed Form U4s, required plaintiffs to submit to FINRA
arbitration.38 The arbitration agreements provided that:
Any claim or controversy concerning you arising out of or
in connection with the business activities of [Chase], your
activities and/or your appointment as a registered
representative or your employment and/or the termination
thereof required to be arbitrated by the FINRA Rules shall
be resolved by individual (not class or collective)
arbitration in accordance with the Code of Arbitration
Procedure of the FINRA..., and in accordance with
applicable law.... Further, no claims shall be arbitrated on
a class or collective action or collective or class-wide
basis.39
The district court denied the motion to compel on the
ground that plaintiffs’ class claims fell outside the scope of their
arbitration agreement; the Second Circuit agreed.40 Since class or
collective action claims are prohibited under FINRA Rule 13204,
plaintiffs were not required to arbitrate their claims in the FINRA

38

Id. at 266-69.
Id. at 268 (emphasis in original). Notably, the agreement prevented
plaintiffs only from asserting their claims in FINRA arbitration, not from
asserting their claims in court.
40
Id. at 269.
39
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forum. Thus, plaintiffs were not subject to the parties’ arbitration
agreement governed by FINRA rules.41
This case is significant because the holding effectively
nullifies the class and collective arbitration waiver that the firm
inserted in its PDAA in its employment agreement with its FAs.
Chase clearly wanted to avoid class and collective claims and
wanted to arbitrate disputes with employees. By using the
language quoted above, the firm not only faces class and collective
claims, it has to face them in court.
2.

Contrary Congressional Command

Even if a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration
agreement, courts can refuse to enforce the agreement as to federal
statutory claims if “the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a
contrary Congressional command.’”42
In Cohen v. UBS Financial Services,43 the Second Circuit
rejected an employee’s argument that FINRA Rule 13204, which
bars class and collective claims in FINRA arbitration in intraindustry cases, is a “contrary Congressional command” that

41

Id. at 271-73. The court also ruled that incorporation by reference of
FINRA arbitration rules invokes the rule in effect at the time of the
arbitration, not the rule in effect when the parties entered into the
agreement. Id. at 273.
42
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013)
(citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668-69 (2012))
(second internal citation omitted). For example, Dodd-Frank §922
declares that PDAAs purporting to require arbitration of whistleblower
claims arising under Sarbanes-Oxley are not enforceable. 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(e)(2) (2012).
43
799 F.3d 174, 175 (2d Cir. 2015).
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supersedes the FAA’s command to enforce PDAAs as written,
even if they contain a class action waiver.
Cohen, an FA with UBS Financial Services, Inc. (UBS),
filed a putative class and collection action alleging federal and
state wage-and-hour claims against UBS in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California.44 The case was
transferred to the Southern District of New York, and the
complaint was amended to add other employees of UBS.45
UBS moved to stay the action and compel arbitration,
asserting that plaintiffs’ employment agreements included an
enforceable PDAA with a class action waiver. Cohen–not
disputing that he had entered into an arbitration agreement that
covered all of his claims–opposed the motion, arguing that FINRA
Rule 13204 is a “contrary Congressional commend” that bars UBS
from enforcing the arbitration agreement as well as the class and
collective action waivers.46 The district court agreed with UBS
and stayed the court case pending FINRA arbitration.47
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. The Court of
Appeals concluded that enforcement of the PDAA would not be
“’contrary’ to Rule 13204 because the Rule bars neither the
enforcement of pre-dispute waivers of class and collective action
procedures nor the arbitration of Cohen’s individual claims.”48
The court further stated: “True, the Rule bars arbitration of a claim
so long as it is embedded in a class action or collective action; but
it does not preserve the right to assert a claim in class or collective

44

Id. at 176.
Id.
46
Id. at 177-78.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 178.
45
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form notwithstanding a contractual waiver.”49 The court noted that
class/collective action waivers are “conceptually distinct” from
PDAAs.50 Thus, the court concluded that Rule 13204 does not
prohibit the enforcement of class and collective action waivers.51
In the labor context, the Seventh Circuit recently
concluded that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
precludes enforcement of a collective action waiver as protected
“concerted action.”52 However, because the court concluded that
the NLRA did not conflict with the FAA in that context (because
the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under state law as
illegal and thus covered by the FAA’s savings clause), the court
did not need to decide whether the NLRA is a “contrary
Congressional command.”53 The Seventh Circuit’s approach sets
up a conflict with other circuits that have concluded the NLRA
does not void class/collective action waivers in labor contracts.54

49

Id.
Id. at 179. The court also noted that FINRA does not restrict the
content of firms’ PDAAs with their employees (only those with their
customers). Id.
51
Id. at 180. In contrast, FINRA has held that, in the customer context,
FINRA Rule 12204 is a “contrary Congressional command” that
supersedes the FAA, and thus barred broker-dealers from inserting class
action waivers in their customer agreements. See Dep’t of Enforcement
v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No. 2011029760201 (FINRA
Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 21, 2013).
52
See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., __ F.3d __, No. 15-2997, 2016 WL
3029464 (7th Cir. May 26, 2016).
53
Id. at *6.
54
See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015);
Cellular Sales of Missouri LLC v. NLRB, __ F.3d __, No. 15-1620 and
No. 15-1860, 2016 WL 3093363 (8th Cir. June 2, 2016).
50
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3.

Effective Vindication Doctrine

Another defense to arbitrability asserted by disputants is
that a court should not enforce an arbitration agreement because
enforcement would prevent them from vindicating their statutory
rights. The Supreme Court limited this “effective vindication”
doctrine to cases where claimants can establish they are stripped of
the right to pursue statutory rights, not the ability to pursue them.55
Since Italian Colors, lower federal courts enforce class action
waivers in PDAAs against an “ineffective vindication” challenge.56
On the other hand, several courts have refused to enforce
other aspects of arbitration agreements under the effective
vindication doctrine. In Hayes v. Delbert Services Corp.,57
plaintiffs brought a putative class action against a payday lending
company asserting that the company’s lending practices violated
various state and federal lending laws. The PDAA in the parties’
loan agreement provided that the agreement was subject only to
Indian law and not applicable state and federal law.58 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that the clause, which expressly forbid plaintiffs
from invoking protections guaranteed to them under federal law,
was unenforceable under the effective vindication doctrine.59
Similarly, in Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc.,60 a massage therapy
student brought a putative class action in federal district court
55

Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304,
2311 (2013).
56
See, e.g., Kaspers v. Comcast Corp., 631 F. App'x 779, 783-84 (11th
Cir. 2015).
57
811 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2016).
58
Id. at 668-89.
59
Id. at 675.
60
811 F.3d 371 (10th Cir. 2016).
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against the operator of massage therapy schools for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for failing to pay students for
performing massages on customers.61 The student enrollment
agreement contained a PDAA providing for arbitration at the
American Arbitration Association pursuant to its commercial
arbitration rules. Those rules provide, among other things, that
each party bears its own arbitration expenses. The PDAA also
stated that each party would bear its own attorney’s fees.62
The district court denied defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed under the effective
vindication doctrine.63 The Court of Appeals noted that plaintiff’s
affidavit stated that she could not afford the forum fees. The court
also noted that the arbitration agreement was ambiguous as to
whether the arbitrators were permitted to ignore the fee-shifting
provisions of the FLSA.64 The court concluded that “’it is unlikely
that an employee in [the plaintiff’s] position, faced with the mere
possibility of being reimbursed for arbitrator fees in the future,
would risk advancing those fees in order to access the arbitral
forum.” As a result, the court held that the arbitration agreement
precluded plaintiff from vindicating her statutory rights and was
thus unenforceable.65
Because the Supreme Court has never expressly
invalidated an arbitration agreement under the “effective
vindication” doctrine, it remains to be seen precisely what type of

61

Id. at 373.
Id. at 374.
63
Id. at 375.
64
Id. at 379-80.
65
Id. at 380-81.
62
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right-stripping provision in an arbitration agreement the Court
would view as rendering the agreement unenforceable.
4.

State law defenses

Finally, as stated above,66 the FAA’s “savings clause”
preserves ordinary state law defenses to the enforcement of any
contract as viable challenges to arbitrability, as long as that defense
does not discriminate against arbitration contracts. This section
identifies those defenses and some recent cases interpreting them.
i. Lack of Mutual Assent
One state law-based defense parties invoke to challenge
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is lack of mutual
assent. Federal courts occasionally examine this defense in the
context of a “click-wrap” agreement, where an online purchaser
must click a box to complete a purchase, and that “click” then
binds the consumer to certain terms of service. While most clickwrap agreements are enforced, the Seventh Circuit recently refused
to enforce an arbitration clause contained in a click-wrap
agreement, reasoning that the purchaser did not receive ample
notice of the terms of the clause through the act of clicking.67
Online brokerage firms should ensure that customers who
open accounts online necessarily must see the full account
agreement including any PDAA when they go through the process

66

See supra Part I.
See Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1035-36 (7th Cir.
2016) (affirming district court’s refusal to enforce an online agreement
where the user did not get clear notice of its terms by clicking through the
“I accept” button).
67
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of opening an account. This could insulate the firm from
challenges to the PDAA on the ground of lack of mutual assent.
ii. Unconscionability
While the Supreme Court in Concepcion barred lower
courts from finding class action waivers in arbitration agreements
to be per se substantively unconscionable under state law, lower
courts continue to strike down select arbitration clauses as
unconscionable on other grounds.68
However, in the securities arbitration context, because the
Securities and Exchange Commission has substantial oversight of
the arbitration process and rules and FINRA regulates the content
of PDAAs in customer agreements,69 it is unlikely a court would
conclude that a PDAA in a customer agreement that complies with
FINRA Rule 2268 is unconscionable.
iii. Waiver
Another state law-based defense to the obligation to
arbitrate is the waiver doctrine. Under this doctrine, one party to
an arbitration clause claims the other party waived its right to
arbitrate based on conduct in related litigation. While the
arbitration waiver test varies slightly among the federal circuits
and states, courts typically consider factors such as: (1) the time
elapsed from commencement of litigation to the request for
68

See, e.g., Global Client Solutions, LLC. v. Ossello, 367 P.3d 361
(Mont. 2016) (affirming lower court’s finding that PDAA in a debt
collection plan was unconscionable because obligations of parties to
arbitrate disputes were not mutual). Cf. Merkin v. Vonage Am., Inc., 639
F. App’x 481 (9th Cir. 2016) (enforcing arbitration clause but severing
unconscionable language).
69
See FINRA R. 2268.
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arbitration; (2) the amount and nature of litigation, including
substantive motions and discovery; and (3) prejudice to the party
opposing arbitration.70
This past year, courts continued to examine these factors
when ruling on waiver arguments. For example, in Grigsby &
Associates, Inc. v. M. Securities Inv.,71 underwriters of a
municipal bond offering sought to enjoin arbitration with counderwriters on the ground that respondents waived their right to
arbitrate the dispute.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment
that the co-underwriters did not waive their right to arbitrate the
dispute. In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that “a party
who ‘substantially invokes the litigation machinery prior to
demanding arbitration may waive its right to arbitrate.’”72
However, the court noted that the lawsuits respondents had filed
before the arbitration were insubstantial, in that they largely did
not progress past the filing stage.73 Moreover, the fact that
respondents waited for ten years after the offering to seek
arbitration did not in and of itself constitute a waiver.74 Finally,
petitioners did not show they suffered any prejudice from
respondents’ litigation conduct. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
found that petitioners failed to meet their heavy burden of proving

See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp.,
376 F. App’x 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v.
Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By this opinion we
alert the bar in this Circuit that failure to invoke arbitration at the first
available opportunity will presumptively extinguish a client's ability later
to opt for arbitration.”).
71
635 F. App’x 728 (11th Cir. 2015).
72
Id. at 731.
73
Id. at 732.
74
Id. at 733.
70
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that respondents acted so inconsistently with their right to arbitrate
as to constitute waiver.75
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit found that a disputant had
waived its right to arbitrate in In re Cox Enterprises, Inc. Set-top
Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig.76 In that case, a putative
antitrust class action, defendant cable company moved to compel
arbitration two years after plaintiffs filed the action.77 During that
two-year time frame, the plaintiffs fought off motions to dismiss,
sought (and achieved) class certification, and engaged in extensive
discovery with defendant. Defendant did not inform the district
court of the existence of the PDAAs in the cable subscribers’
service agreements at the class certification stage. Instead,
defendant moved to compel arbitration the same day it filed its
motion for summary judgment.78 The district court denied
defendant’s motion to compel, finding that defendant’s “failure to
inform it about the presence of the arbitration agreements until
after certification was inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate and
suggested ‘an attempt to manipulate the process, or at least to
attempt multiple bites at the apple.’”79 Based on that fact as well
as other factors, including prejudice to plaintiffs and the judicial
process, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of waiver.80
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Id. at 734; see also Hoover Gen. Contractors-Homewood, Inc. v. Key,
__ So.3d __, No. 1141208, 2016 WL 687070, *4 (Ala. Feb. 19, 2016)
(contractor did not waive its right to enforce arbitration clause by moving
to compel arbitration six months after complaint was filed where its
“participation in [the] case consists of filing three separate pleadings,
twice moving to continue the pretrial conference, and filing
counterclaims”).
76
790 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 2015).
77
Id. at 1115.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1116 (quoting district court).
80
Id. at 1120-21; see also Principal Investments, Inc. v. Harrison, 366
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If arbitration has not been ruled out as desirable,
practitioners in this field should be cognizant of taking too many
steps in a litigation so as to avoid inadvertently waiving any right
to arbitrate the dispute.
iv. Nonsignatories to Arbitration
Agreements
Some parties resist arbitration on the ground that they did
not sign the relevant arbitration agreement. However, courts
sometimes compel nonsignatories to arbitrate under various state
law contract doctrines.81 For example, in Akpele v. Pac. Life Ins.
Co.,82 plaintiff, a widow who learned that she had not been
designated as her husband’s beneficiary in three of his retirement
accounts, brought suit against Pacific Life Insurance Company,
Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., two of Oppenheimer’s agents and the
temporary administrator of her husband’s estate. In opening his
first two accounts, plaintiff’s deceased husband had signed a client
agreement containing a PDAA that was binding on successors. The
district court required plaintiff to arbitrate her dispute before a
FINRA panel.83 The panel ruled in favor of Oppenheimer and one
of its agents. The district court confirmed the award.84
On appeal, plaintiff argued, inter alia, that she was not
bound by the arbitration clause because “she did not benefit from,

P.3d 688 (Nev. 2016) (denying payday loan company’s motion to compel
arbitration on ground that it had waived its right to arbitrate).
81
See Arthur Andersen LLP v Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009) (holding
that, under the FAA, state law principles may permit an arbitration
agreement to be enforced by or against a nonsignatory).
82
__ F. App’x __, No. 15-11529, 2016 WL 1319354 (11th Cir. Apr. 5,
2016).
83
Id. at *1.
84
Id.
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consent to, or ratify an action of her husband that would bind her
under the client agreement.”85 The district court reasoned, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed, that she was bound by the agreement as
a “successor” under both federal and state law.86
Likewise, in Evans v. Bayles,87 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia compelled a widow to arbitrate claims
arising out of her deceased husband’s Ameriprise brokerage
account even though the account agreement containing the PDAA
was not signed.88 Her husband had signed an IRA Application,
which included an acknowledgement that the client had received
and read the Brokerage Client Agreement, and that the agreement
included a PDAA. However, he never signed the Brokerage
Agreement itself. The Supreme Court of Appeals ruled the
arbitration agreement was incorporated by reference into the IRA
Application, which he did sign.89 Thus, the court required his
widow to arbitrate her dispute over the payout of the proceeds of
her late husband’s account.
Some courts are unwilling to enforce an arbitration
agreement against a nonsignatory if there is no evidence that the
nonsignatory actually knew of the agreement, nor any evidence it
received a tangible or direct benefit from it. For example, in
Pershing, L.L.C. v. Bevis,90 plaintiffs were a group of 16 investors
85

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4-5; see also Tamsco Props., LLC v. Langemeier, 597 F. App'x
428 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming lower court’s grant of motion to compel
arbitration of nonsignatories whose agents attended conferences
sponsored by the defendants and signed PDAAs at those conferences on
investors’ behalf).
87
No. 15-0600, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 427, at *1 (June 1, 2016).
88
Id. at *5.
89
Id. at *15.
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606 F. App'x 754, 758 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming order enjoining
arbitration).
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who bought Stanford certificates of deposit (CDs) from the now
infamous Stanford Ponzi scheme.91 Pershing was Stanford’s
clearing broker during the relevant time period. The 16 investors
along with 84 others who invested in the CDs commenced a
FINRA arbitration against Pershing, alleging Pershing had played
a material role in defrauding them.92 Pershing did not resist
arbitration with the 84 investors, as they had used Pershing’s
services in purchasing the CDs. However, Pershing persuaded the
district court to enjoin the group of 16 from arbitrating their claims
against it, as Pershing had no contractual relation with them;
rather, they had purchased their CDs directly through the bank or
Stanford’s trust company. The Fifth Circuit agreed, refusing to
compel arbitration of Pershing as a nonsignatory.93
5.

Unavailability of forum

Another defense to arbitrability is that the forum
designated in the PDAA is unavailable. The Eleventh Circuit
refused to compel arbitration of a dispute that was subject to an
arbitration clause because the designated forum was not available.
In Flagg v. First Premier Bank,94 plaintiff filed a class action
lawsuit against First Premier Bank, alleging that defendant
facilitated illegal transactions of online payday lenders.95
Plaintiff’s loan agreement included a PDAA that stated that all
disputes were to be resolved “by and under the Code of Procedure
of the National Arbitration Forum [NAF].”96 However, NAF
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Id. at 756.
Id. at 755.
93
Id. at 758.
94
__ F. App’x __, No. 15-14052, 2016 WL 703063 (11th Cir. Feb. 23,
2016).
95
Id. at *1.
96
Id.
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declined plaintiff’s request to arbitrate her claim, as it had not been
accepting consumer arbitration claims since 2009.97
Plaintiff then sued in federal district court. Defendant,
arguing that §5 of the FAA requires the appointment of a substitute
for NAF,98 moved to compel arbitration and appoint a substitute
forum, and to stay or dismiss the proceedings.99 The district court
denied defendant’s motion.100
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the forum
selection “was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate.”101 If
the selected forum is not available, the court would not enforce the
arbitration agreement.
6.

Arbitration “has been had” under FAA
section 3

Under FAA §3, upon motion of a party, a district court
must stay court proceedings on issues subject to arbitration “until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.”102 In Tillman v. Tillman,103 the Ninth Circuit
permitted a lawsuit to go forward in court despite the existence of
a valid arbitration agreement because the arbitrator had dismissed
the arbitration after one party could not afford to pay her share of

97

Id.
FAA §5 “requires the [court’s] appointment of a substitute arbitrator
when the arbitrator designated by the parties is unavailable.” Khan v. Dell
Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 350-51 (3d Cir. 2012).
99
Id. at *3.
100
Id.
101
Id. at *4.
102
9 U.S.C. §3.
103
Tillman v. Tillman, __ F.3d __, No. 13-56624, 2016 WL 3343785 (9th
Cir. June 15, 2016).
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the arbitrator fees.104 In Tillman, a legal malpractice action arising
out of a wrongful death lawsuit, defendant law firm first moved to
compel arbitration and stay the court action based on an arbitration
clause in its retainer agreement with the widow, Mrs. Tillman.105
The district court granted the motion, and the parties proceeded to
arbitrate their dispute at the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) as provided for in their agreement.106
In the arbitration, Mrs. Tillman was unable to deposit
$18,562.50 required by the AAA as a condition of continuing the
proceedings. Thus, pursuant to AAA Rules, the arbitrator
terminated the arbitration due to the insufficient deposit.107 The
firm then moved in district court under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) to lift the stay and dismiss Mrs. Tillman’s
complaint for failure to comply with the court order to arbitrate. In
response, Mrs. Tillman submitted an affidavit attesting to her
financial condition and inability to pay the arbitration deposit.108
The district court ultimately dismissed the complaint,
though not pursuant to Rule 41(b). The court instead reasoned
that, because the AAA’s rules required the parties “to bear the
costs of arbitration equally and allowed the arbitrator to suspend
the proceedings,” the FAA “deprived the district court of authority
to hear ‘the claims that would have been subject to the arbitration
agreement,’ and dismissal was required.”109

104

The Tenth Circuit ruled similarly this past year. See Pre-Paid Legal
Services, Inc. v. Cahill, 786 F.3d 1287 (10 th Cir. 2015) (lifting stay of
action pending arbitration because employee defendant failed to pay his
share of arbitration fees and arbitrators terminated arbitration).
105
2016 WL 3343785, at *1-2.
106
Id. at *2.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at *3.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that, under FAA §3, the
district court had the power to lift the stay of the court proceedings
and allow the court case to go forward.110 Since the AAA’s rules
expressly allowed the arbitrator to terminate the arbitration
proceeding without entering an award or judgment when one party
failed to make a required deposit, the court concluded that Mrs.
Tillman’s arbitration had been “had in accordance with the terms
of the [arbitration] agreement” under FAA §3.111 The Court of
Appeals noted that no section of the FAA compels a court to
dismiss a case once the arbitration had concluded in accordance
with agreed-upon rules.112
This unusual case strikes me as an alternative to the
“effective vindication” doctrine for a disputant that can
demonstrate he or she cannot afford arbitration forum fees and
costs. Rather than show the unaffordable arbitration fees strip the
disputant of the right to pursue the claim, the disputant can rely on
the procedural rules of the forum that permit a final dismissal of
the arbitration if one party does not deposit fees. The arbitration
has thus “been had” within the meaning of FAA §3, allowing the
case to go forward in court.

110

Id.
Id. at *4 (quoting FAA §3).
112
Id. at *6. On a related question characterized as a “matter of first
impression,” the Second Circuit ruled that the district court has the power
to lift a stay, but not dismiss the action, when it refers all claims in the
complaint to arbitration under FAA §3. See Katz v. Cellco Partnership,
794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015). The court reasoned that a dismissal creates
an immediately appealable order, which leads to more, not less, litigation,
an outcome that is inconsistent with the FAA. Id. at 345-46.
111
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C.

Defenses to Arbitrability Unique to FINRA
Context
1. Who is a “Customer” Under FINRA Rule
12200?

In FINRA arbitration, even in the absence of a PDAA in
an agreement between the parties, a FINRA member firm must
arbitrate a claim if “requested by a customer,” “[t]he dispute is
between a customer and a member or associated person of a
member; and [t]he dispute arises in connection with the business
activities of the member or the associated person . . . .”113
Thus, in a customer case, respondents may resist
arbitration on the ground that claimant is not a “customer” of the
FINRA member firm within the meaning of Rule 12200. FINRA
does not define “customer,” except for its mention in Rule
12100(i) (a “customer shall not include a broker or dealer”), and
courts struggle to define the term. The leading definition is from
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Abbar.114 There, the Second
Circuit issued “a bright-line rule” and held that “a ‘customer’
under FINRA Rule 12200 is one who, while not a broker or dealer,
either (1) purchases a good or service from a FINRA member, or
(2) has an account with a FINRA member.”115

113

FINRA R. 12200.
761 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2014).
115
Id. at 275. See Dougherty v. VFG, LLC, 118 F. Supp. 3d 699, 713
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (applying Abbar definition of “customer” and granting
motion to compel brokerage firm to arbitrate).
114
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However, in AXA Advisors, LLC v. Lee,116 the district
court held that Abbar did not change the Second Circuit’s prior
holding117 that a customer of an associated person who does not
have an account with the associated person’s firm was nevertheless
a “customer” of that firm under Rule 12200. In Lee, investors who
did not have accounts with AXA brought an arbitration proceeding
against AXA arising out of losses from the “selling away”
activities of an AXA registered representative. AXA sued in
federal court to enjoin the arbitration.118 While recognizing the
utility of the Abbar definition of “customer,” the district court
went further. The Lee court concluded that the investors had the
right to seek arbitration against AXA under Rule 12200 because
they were customers of its associated person.119
2. Can a Forum Selection Clause Trump the
Duty to Arbitrate?
A question related to “who is a customer” is whether a
FINRA member’s duty to arbitrate at the request of a customer
under Rule 12200 supersedes a forum selection clause in a
customer agreement. Last year’s update covered a recent Second
Circuit case holding that it does not.120 This year, the Second
116

No. 1:15-CV-137-BLW, 2016 WL 335852 (D. Idaho Jan. 27, 2016)
(slip op.) (compelling broker-dealer to arbitrate investors’ claim that its
registered representative was “selling away” from the firm).
117
See John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2001).
118
Lee, 2016 WL 335852, at *1.
119
Id. at *4.
120
See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Sch. Fin. Auth., 764
F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2014). But see Jill I. Gross, The Customer’s NonWaivable Right to Choose Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 10
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 383 (2016) (arguing that recently
amended section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act voids a forum
selection clause in a customer agreement that purports to force a customer
to waive its right to compel a FINRA member to arbitrate).

27

Circuit similarly held that a “more specific” forum selection clause
in a broker-dealer’s employment agreement with an associated
person trumped the firm’s duty to arbitrate a dispute with its
employee under FINRA Rule 13200.121
D.

Vacating Arbitration Awards

To successfully challenge an arbitration award that is
governed by the FAA, parties must establish one of the four
grounds for vacatur listed in FAA §10(a).122 Disputants rarely
invoke section 10(a)(1) (“where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means”), but they more frequently
invoke sections 10(a)(2)-(4), which are discussed below.
1.

Evident Partiality

Losing parties to arbitration awards can seek vacatur
pursuant to FAA § 10(a)(2) if they show “evident partiality” in one
or more arbitrators. The Supreme Court’s only decision under that
subsection is the 48-year old decision in Commonwealth Coatings
v. Continental Casualty Co.,123 which yielded plurality and
concurring opinions that are difficult to synthesize. As a result,
lower courts have had difficulty developing a test for “evident
partiality,” since most circuits follow a version of the test set forth
thirty years ago by the Second Circuit:124 “evident partiality” is
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See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249 (2d Cir.
2016).
122
See Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
123
393 U.S. 145 (1968).
124
See Morelite Constr. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Ben.
Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984).
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“where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an
arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.”125
Under that strict test, courts routinely reject claims of
evident partiality. Thus, it is unusual when a district court vacates
an award on the ground that the arbitrator was biased. It is even
more notable when an appellate court reverses a vacatur on this
ground – which happened several times in the past year.126
For example, in Mendel v. Morgan Keegan & Co.,
plaintiff filed a FINRA arbitration against Morgan Keegan,
claiming losses in mutual funds due to the fund’s investments in
risky asset-backed securities.127 Though a unanimous panel
awarded the investor $279,500.31, he challenged the arbitral award
in Alabama state court, claiming that the award represented less
than a tenth of his actual losses.128
In his motion to vacate, Mendel argued that one of the
panel members had an undisclosed potential conflict of interest
because Mendel discovered post-hearing that the arbitrator’s
employing law firm had previously represented Morgan Keegan in
unrelated matters.129 However, Mendel did not show that the panel
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Id. at 83.
See, e.g., Ruhe v. Massimo Corp., __ F. App’x __, Nos. 14–55556,
14–55725, 2016 WL 685115 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016); Mendel v. Morgan
Keegan & Co., __ F. App’x __, No. 15-12801, 2016 WL 3626783 (11th
Cir. Mar. 23, 2016); Johnson v. Directory Assistants, Inc., 797 F.3d 1294
(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (reversing district court’s vacatur of award
for evident partiality despite panelist’s disclosed past service as an
arbitrator on a previous case involving the defendant and the undisclosed
number of cases the defendant had at the forum).
127
2016 WL 685115, at *1.
128
Id.
129
Id. The arbitrator had disclosed the name of his law firm pre-hearing.
126
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member actually knew of the conflict.130 After Morgan Keegan
removed the case to federal court, the district court applied
Alabama’s definition of “evident partiality” and vacated the award
under §10(a)(2).131
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the Northern
District of Alabama erred in applying Alabama state law rather
than federal law in interpreting §10(a)(2).132 The Eleventh Circuit
stated that, under federal law, there “are two ways to show evident
partiality: (1) an actual conflict, or (2) knowing nondisclosure of a
potential conflict.”133 The court concluded that Mendel did not
meet this standard because he did not argue that the panel member
was actually biased and did not show the panel member knew of
but failed to disclose the potential conflict.134 Thus, the appellate
court reversed the district court’s vacatur of the award.
Is an arbitrator automatically “evidently partial” when the
parties’ arbitration agreement provides for an arbitrator to assess
the propriety of his own conduct?135 In an opinion arising out of
the Tom Brady “Deflategate” scandal,136 the Second Circuit
considered this very question. There, the NFL Commissioner
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Id. at *2.
Id.
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Id. at *3. But see Finn v. Ballentine Partners, LLC, __ A.3d __, 2016
WL 3268852, *9 (NH June 14, 2016) (state law grounds for vacatur not
preempted by FAA).
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Id. at *2 (quoting Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM
Inv'r Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1998)).
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Id. at *3-4.
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conceivable that a FINRA arbitrator might be called upon to assess the
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brought in arbitration.
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suspended Tom Brady four games for allegedly deflating footballs
in a championship game more than permitted. Brady demanded
arbitration to challenge the suspensions pursuant to the NFL
Players Association’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA).137
In the CBA, the parties agreed that the NFL Commissioner would
serve as the arbitrator. After arbitration, the Commissioner upheld
the discipline that he had imposed.
The Players Association moved to vacate the award on
numerous grounds, and the district court granted the motion. On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals
rejected, inter alia, the Players Association’s contention that the
NFL Commissioner who served as the arbitrator was “evidently
partial” because he was “adjudicating the propriety of his own
conduct.”138 Because the CBA provided that the Commissioner
would serve as arbitrator, the Court of Appeals concluded that
“parties to an arbitration can ask for no more impartiality than
inheres in the method they have chosen.”139
2. Refusal to Hold a Hearing
A court can vacate an award under FAA §10(a)(3) if the
losing party shows “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
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Id. at 531-32.
Id. at 548. The Players Association claimed that the Commissioner
had improperly delegated his disciplinary authority during the
investigation. Id. at 534-35.
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any party have been prejudiced.”140 The Second Circuit recently
interpreted this ground:
Vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) is warranted only when
the arbitration proceedings were ‘fundamentally unfair.’
Fairness requires arbitrators to give a party an ‘adequate
opportunity to present its evidence and argument,’ but it
does not require them to ‘hear all the evidence proffered
by a party.’ Moreover, ‘[a]rbitrators have substantial
discretion to admit or exclude evidence.’141
In Akpele v. Pac. Life Ins. Co.,142 a widow arbitrated
negligence and intentional torts claims against defendants after she
discovered that she was not named as a beneficiary in three of her
husband’s retirement accounts.143 At the hearing, plaintiff offered
into evidence a defined benefit plan and its trust document,
sponsored by her late husband’s medical practice, presumably to
show that spousal consent was required to change a beneficiary.144
The panel excluded the two documents, however, because plaintiff
did not produce the documents in a timely manner in violation of
FINRA discovery rules.145
After she lost in arbitration, plaintiff moved to vacate the
award under this section, claiming the panel’s preclusion of the
two documents was arbitrator misconduct under section 10(a)(3).
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9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).
Glob. Gold Min., LLC v. Ayvazian, 612 F. App'x 11, 14 (2d Cir.
2015) (internal citations omitted).
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The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion
that the exclusion of the documents was reasonable because of the
discovery violation. Further, the Court of Appeals agreed with the
district court that the panel’s decision was not made in bad faith,
and did not deprive plaintiff of a fair hearing.146
Similarly, the Second Circuit also rejected the argument
that violation of the forum’s arbitral rules – in this case, an
arbitrator’s disclosure obligations – could constitute arbitrator
“corruption” or “misbehavior” within the meaning of section
10(a)(1), (2) or (3).147 The Court of Appeals emphasized
that the shipper's attempt to secure vacatur based on a
violation of private arbitral rules runs headlong into the
principle that parties may not expand by contract the
FAA’s grounds for vacating an award. …if an arbitrator’s
failure to comply with arbitral rules, without more, could
properly be considered ‘corruption’ or ‘misbehavior,’ the
FAA’s grounds for vacatur would be precisely as varied
and expansive as the rules private parties might choose to
adopt. We accordingly reject this argument.148
3.

Exceeding Powers

Since arbitrators derive all of their authority to decide
disputes from the parties’ arbitration agreement, a court can vacate
an award under §10(a)(4) if the arbitrators exceed the authority
provided by that agreement. Under this ground for vacatur, courts
consider only “whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted
146

Id.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Team Tankers A.S., 811 F.3d 584, 589 (2d Cir.
2016).
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the parties’ contract, not whether he got its meaning right or
wrong.”149 Parties sometimes invoke this ground when
challenging an award (or no award) of attorney’s fees, with
varying success.150
In Leeward Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Am. Univ. of AntiguaColl. of Med., the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of a motion to vacate on a number of grounds, including
“exceeding powers.”151 The losing party contended that the
arbitrators exceeded their powers by not issuing a “reasoned
award” as required. The Court of Appeals first concluded that the
arbitrators were in fact required to issue a reasoned award because
they agreed to do so in the preliminary hearing.152 Next, the court
considered, as a matter of first impression, the definition of a
reasoned award. The court wrote:
[W]e …hold today that a reasoned award is something
more than a line or two of unexplained conclusions, but
something less than full findings of fact and conclusions of
law on each issue raised before the panel. A reasoned
award sets forth the basic reasoning of the arbitral panel on
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Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013).
See, e,g, Jones v. Dancel, 792 F.3d 395, 405 (4th Cir. 2015) (arbitrator
did not exceed authority by declining to award additional attorney’s fees
because he “interpreted the parties’ arbitration provision and the
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the central issue or issues raised before it. It need not delve
into every argument made by the parties.153
I do not believe this definition of “reasoned award” applies
to FINRA arbitration, because FINRA uses the term “explained
decision” when the parties jointly request the arbitrator to include
an explanation in the award. Moreover, FINRA rules expressly
define the term: “An explained decision is a fact-based award
stating the general reason(s) for the arbitrators' decision. Inclusion
of legal authorities and damage calculations is not required.”154
4.

Manifest Disregard of the Law

Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.155 that the FAA provides the exclusive
grounds for review of an arbitration award and parties to an
arbitration agreement cannot contractually expand the judicial
grounds of review, the circuit courts have split on whether an
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid
ground to vacate an arbitration award. The Supreme Court
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.156 The circuit split continues unchanged
since last year’s Arbitration Law Update, (with one adjustment for
the Fifth Circuit) as follows:

The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
acknowledge the continued vitality of the “manifest disregard”
ground of vacatur.157
153
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The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly
ruled that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur ground.158

The Fifth Circuit has held that manifest disregard
is not available as a non-statutory ground for review,159 but this
past year declined to decide whether it could be a statutory ground
for review.160

The First and D.C. Circuits have addressed
“manifest disregard” subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.161

manifest disregard grounds and reaffirming principle that arbitrators need
not provide any rationale for their award); Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand,
671 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although we find that manifest
disregard continues to exist as either an independent ground for review or
as a judicial gloss, we need not decide which of the two it is because
Wachovia’s claim fails under both”); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW,
L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008); Comedy Club, Inc. v.
Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009). But see
Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814 (6th Cir. 2014)
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have yet to explicitly decide whether the bases for vacatur asserted by
Curtis can be statutory grounds for vacatur, we need not decide this issue
today”).
161
See Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59, 65 (1st
Cir. 2015) (acknowledging that the circuit has “not squarely determined
whether our manifest disregard case law can be reconciled with Hall
Street”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Affinity Fin. Corp. v.
AARP Fin., Inc., 468 F. App’x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (assuming without
deciding that manifest disregard of the law standard survived Hall Street).

36


The Third and Tenth Circuits have expressly
declined to address the issue.162

The Seventh Circuit has held that “manifest
disregard” is not a ground of vacatur, except if arbitrators order
parties to violate the legal rights of others.163
5. Waiver of Vacatur Right
Finally, in a cautionary tale to parties to diligently research
their arbitrators before the hearing, the Third Circuit held in the
past year that a party can waive its right to challenge an award if it
had constructive knowledge of the alleged ground of vacatur at the
hearing. In Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Athena Venture Partners,
L.P.,164 the Court of Appeals held that the claimant had waived its
right to challenge the award on the basis that one arbitrator had not
made full disclosures.165

162

See Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir.
2016) (recognizing circuit split and expressly declining to decide that
issue); Abbott v. Law Office of Patrick J. Mulligan, 440 F. App’x 612,
620 (10th Cir. 2011) (“in the absence of firm guidance from the Supreme
Court, we decline to decide whether the manifest disregard standard
should be entirely jettisoned”).
163
See Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 660 F.3d
281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Except to the extent recognized in George
Watts & Son [v. Tiffany & Co., Inc., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (ruling
that “a court may set aside an award that directs the parties to violate the
legal rights of third persons who did not consent to the arbitration”)],
‘manifest disregard of the law’ is not a ground on which a court may
reject an arbitrator’s award under the Federal Arbitration Act.”). But see
Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2015)
(stating, in dicta, that an award can be vacated under §10(a)(4) “if the
arbitrator deliberately disregards what he knows to be the law”) (internal
quotation omitted).
164
803 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2015).
165
Id. at 150-51.

37

Athena brought a FINRA arbitration against Goldman
Sachs (GS) for multi-million dollar losses in a GS product that
claimed to be a short-term, low-risk investment. After losing the
arbitration, Athena moved to vacate the award, arguing that a postaward investigation revealed that a panel member, in addition to a
disclosed [on the day of hearing] bar association complaint against
him, had several other ethical and criminal complaints pending
against him.166
The district court granted Athena’s motion to vacate,
finding that FINRA had failed to provide parties with three
qualified arbitrators.167 GS appealed, arguing that Athena had
waived its right to seek to vacate the award by failing to object
during the FINRA hearing to the arbitrator’s incomplete and
misleading disclosure.168
The Third Circuit agreed with GS and reinstated the award
in GS’s favor. The court stressed that a party should not wait until
losing to begin its search for adverse information to use to
challenge the award, and that the arbitrator’s initial disclosure
should have been enough to provoke alarm in Athena.169 Because
Athena had constructive knowledge of a basis to challenge the
arbitrator’s participation and failed to do so until after an
unfavorable award, it waived its right to seek vacatur on that
basis.170

166

Id. at 145-46.
Id. at 147.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 148-50.
170
Id. at 150.
167
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